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ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY
James Fanto*
This Article focuses on the role of organizational liability and
the corporate monitor in addressing corruption in publicly traded
business firms. The major disagreements with respect to
organizational liability involve belief and theory. The belief issue
concerns whether one thinks that groups, organizations, and larger
social bodies or institutions significantly determine a scandal or
corruption in a business firm. My sense is that many people believe
that these social factors are unimportant background or, at best,
secondary causes. If one accepts (as I do) that a scandal is
determined by group, organizational, and institutional factors, as
well as by individuals, there should be a theory that draws a
relationship between these causes in a coherent way. Indeed, the
need for a comprehensive theory linking these numerous factors is
suggested by research findings that, in a given situation, there is
often no single factor, whether individual, group, or organizational,
that entirely explains the corruption in an organization because it is
caused by multiple factors, with certain ones being more important
than others in any given situation.1 Moreover, if one accepts that
multiple causes determine organizational corruption, it is difficult
then to make policy suggestions for remedying the problems
without a coherent theory.
Social psychology and organizational research offer theoretical
frameworks that attempt to reconcile the different causal factors.2

* Professor, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank my colleague,
Professor Miriam Baer, for inviting me to participate on the panel and my copanelists, Professors Henning and Orland. © All rights reserved.
1
See generally YOAV VARDI & ELY WEITZ, MISBEHAVIOR IN
ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND MANAGEMENT 23 (2004).
2
One useful collection of articles with various theoretical frameworks is
the July issue of 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. (2008).

45

46

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

One particularly useful framework distinguishes between
“organizations of corrupt individuals” and a “corrupt
organization.”3 The former case involves “bottom up” corruption
where rogue individuals in a corporation focus on their own
personal benefit at the detriment of organizational goals. Their
perspective and practices can also adversely affect an organization,
or at least parts of it. For example, one thinks of a police
department where there are rogue officers. Generally, individuals
or “bad apples” are the cause of such corruption although group,
organizational, and cultural issues may be implicated as well, as
others imitate the individuals’ conduct in the organization.4 A
corrupt organization, by contrast, is generally characterized by “top
down” misconduct orchestrated by senior executives of a firm who
act primarily for the firm’s own goals (e.g., to enhance
profitability) and who establish models of thinking and conduct for
others in the organization, but whose activities end up being
harmful to third parties (e.g., shareholders, communities) and
ultimately to the overall organization.5 Many examples of this kind
of corrupt organization come to mind, for this is the typical
scenario of a corporate or financial scandal: Enron with the singleminded focus of its top management on maximizing shareholder
value, even if the executives perverted the ways to achieve it;6 and
a contemporary example is Goldman Sachs, with its culture of
trading for the firm’s benefit at the expense of its service to
clients.7
A corrupt organization requires a different method of reform
than does an organization of corrupt individuals. While reform in
3

See generally Jonathan Pinto et al., Corrupt Organizations or
Organizations of Corrupt Individuals? Two Types of Organization-Level
Corruption, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 685 (2008).
4
See id. at 688–89.
5
See id. at 689–90.
6
See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS
IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003).
7
See generally Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Goldman Sachs &
Co., No. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010). The SEC and Goldman have
just entered into a settlement. Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229 (BSJ)
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010).
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the former case centers on removing the “bad apples” from the
firm, the latter demands significant organizational reform beyond
expelling the executives who pushed the firm down the road of
corruption. Even if the senior executives in a public firm are
removed, the perverse organizational mindset and practices may
remain, for they have become ingrained in the culture of the firm.
Depending upon the extent of the corruption, there must be an
extensive “top-to-bottom” reform of the affected (one might say
“infected”) firm’s ways of doing business. In the worst case, the
organization must be disbanded because it is irretrievably corrupt
and beyond reform. Drexel Burnham Lambert in the financial
sector,8 and Arthur Andersen in the accounting industry are prime
examples.9 Ending the existence of a corrupt organization,
however, can be problematic, for it can result in the dispersion of
individuals from the organization, which means that the corrupt
mindset and practices propagate throughout the industry as the
individuals take positions at other firms.10 Again, Goldman Sachs,
which has “alums” throughout the financial world, including in
financial regulation, is an example of a firm that spreads its
questionable practices through its alumni.11
Moreover, there are broad social and cultural factors that
reinforce the individual, group, and organizational mindsets that
lead to corruption within business firms. If these factors are not
addressed, reforming the organization will not adequately remedy
the undesirable conduct.12 For example, there are numerous social
causes for the misconduct in Enron and in the financial
8

This was Michael Milken’s junk bond investment bank. For a contrasting
view of the firm’s demise, see generally DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE
CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION
(1995).
9
Arthur Andersen, one remembers, collapsed when it was indicted in
connection with its auditing of Enron.
10
See John M. Darley, Social Organization for the Production of Evil, 3
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 199, 208–11 (1992).
11
For example, two Goldman Sachs alums include Robert Rubin, the
former Treasury Secretary and Chairman of Citigroup, and Jon Corzine, the
former New Jersey Governor.
12
On these issues, see generally Vilmos F. Misangyi et al., Ending
Corruption: The Interplay Among Institutional Logics, Resources, and
Institutional Entrepreneurs, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 750 (2008).
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conglomerates that were at the heart of the financial crisis,
including the academic and professional training received by their
executives in business schools and in their professional careers.
More simply put, their training was based upon a specific view of
human beings (i.e., self-interested profit maximizers), and this
view then became a self-fulfilling reality when individuals began
to act in accordance with the theory and expected everyone else to
do the same.13 Thus, remedying business corruption requires a
transformation of the basis of business training, which goes beyond
the reform of specific business organizations. Significantly, the
issue of organizational corruption is complex and a simple
solution, such as the expulsion or incarceration of a few
individuals, does not accomplish meaningful reform of a corrupt
firm.
Organizational liability, whether criminal or “quasi criminal”
in the form of an enforcement action brought by a government
agency such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),
is one way in which a corrupt business organization can be
reformed. The major problem with organizational liability, whether
in the criminal or civil enforcement context, is that it has not been
used in a sustained, thoughtful way to reform corrupt
organizations. Rather, it has served as a tool for making an
organization a part of the prosecutorial process against corrupt
(and even not so corrupt) individuals in the firm.14 The
13

See, e.g., Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad Management Theories Are Destroying
Good Management Practices, 4 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 75, 76-77
(2005); Dennis A. Gioia, Business Education’s Role in the Crisis of Corporate
Confidence, 16 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 142, 143 (2002).
14
See James A. Fanto, Recognizing the “Bad Barrel” in Public Business
Firms: Social and Organizational Factors in Misconduct by Senior DecisionMakers, 57 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 54-61 (2009) [hereinafter Bad Barrel]. A wellknown example of the use of organizational prosecution to reach individuals is
the prosecution of executives of the accounting firm KPMG in the Southern
District of New York. In several thoughtful opinions, Judge Kaplan found that
prosecutors coerced KPMG not to provide assistance and defense to the accused
employees. For a description of this jurisprudence and related developments, see
JAMES A. FANTO, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY § 7.6 (2d ed. 2009).
See also John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009) (arguing that
corporate liability is un-American in that it gives prosecutors too much
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prosecutorial and enforcement situation concerning business
organizations today is heavily weighted against the accused
employees when they are alleged to be involved in a criminal
violation or a serious civil infraction. Under pressure from
prosecutors and enforcement personnel, an accused firm will
identify individuals to be sacrificed as scapegoats for the benefit of
the organization. The organization can then undertake reforms,
even if they lack substance, and argue to the outside world that the
problem has been addressed because the “bad apples” have been
expelled. The use of organizational liability thus reflects the belief
that corruption in a firm is due to the “bad apples,” and not to a
perverse firm culture or business practices that in fact transcend
individuals.
It is not the place here to explore in detail the reasons for this
use.15 Suffice it to say here that there are interrelated individual,
group, organizational, and institutional reasons for this
prosecutorial and enforcement emphasis on prosecuting
individuals. For example, prosecutors have limited time horizons
in office and for career reasons want the kind of visible results that
come from putting away the “bad guys.” Organizations, like
offices of U.S. attorneys and the SEC Enforcement Division, have
institutional practices and are part of a legal system that focuses on
individual liability. Moreover, prosecutors and enforcement staff
are driven by the U.S. ideological tenet that outcomes are due
primarily to individuals.
That being said, the question arises whether organizational
liability could be altered to affect real reform of a corrupt business
firm. This question raises the issue of the role of the corporate
monitor, which is a standard part of the deferred or the no
prosecution agreement. In practice, the corporate monitor is often a
former prosecutor or judge who is appointed for a limited term to
discretion in the prosecution of individuals in firms). But see generally Sara Sun
Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1481 (2009) (arguing that these abuses do not characterize just corporate
criminal liability, but criminal prosecution more generally. For example,
prosecutors are given too much discretion, the crimes are overly broad and not
always aimed at reprehensible conduct, and innocent third parties are often
punished.).
15
For an in-depth discussion on this topic, see Bad Barrel, supra note 14.
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ensure that the business firm reforms itself in line with the
commitments it made in the agreement. The monitor is, therefore,
an outsider to the firm and even to the firm’s business and has a
defined, restricted role, except in unusual cases.16 The firm’s
commitments in an agreement are often of a highly legal or
technical nature. The firm, for example, might commit to
enhancing its compliance system, increasing compliance and ethics
training for employees, incorporating more oversight into
transaction approvals, and hiring outside auditors or other parties
to help it develop compliance or other systems.17 The goal of the
corporate monitor is to see that these commitments are fulfilled,
which has a “check the box” aspect about his or her tasks.18
This kind of a corporate monitor is likely to be useful, or at
worse only to be a minor expense, in a situation where a scandal
involved only corrupt individuals and a partial corruption of the
organization. The “bad apples” will be removed, and the monitor’s
supervision of the organization’s reforms will help the firm put
itself back on the lawful path and, as discussed below, will send a
signal to outsiders about its rehabilitation. Again, given the
dynamics of organizational prosecution, this kind of monitor with a
compliance orientation is applied in all cases of corruption because
of the underlying assumption that they primarily involve corrupt
individuals.
However, this monitor will generally be of little value in a
corrupt organization, where the organizational beliefs and ways of
conduct (in short, its culture) have been altered and corrupted.
16

One unusual case was Richard Breeden’s appointment as a monitor of
WorldCom by Judge Rakoff. Mr. Breeden was involved in a wholesale reform
of the firm. See generally RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST, REPORT
TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE
FUTURE OF MCI, INC. (2003).
17
See U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, ATTY’S OFF., PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9-28.1300 (2008).
18
For the Department of Justice’s discussion of the selection and tasks of
the monitor, see generally Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy
Att’y Gen., U.S. Atty’s Off., to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Atty’s,
Selection of Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and NonProsecution Agreements with Corporations (Mar. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf.
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Since, in other words, corruption has taken root in the
organization, meaningful reform would require an in-depth
transformation of the firm. To be effective in these circumstances a
monitor should have a more open-ended mandate, significant
resources (including advice from firm insiders), adequate
incentives, and the competence to understand how to change
ingrained organizational views and practices. As an alternative, a
traditional compliance-oriented monitor could prove effective in a
corrupt organization scenario, but only if he or she assisted new
executives who were themselves motivated to alter significantly
the organization.
In an earlier article, I examined how federal prosecutors and
the SEC could reorient their deferred or no prosecution agreements
to use a corporate monitor in order to accomplish more significant
organizational reform, in circumstances where such reform was
needed.19 I concluded that the SEC was better situated than federal
prosecutors for this task, since it has jurisdiction over public
companies that are part of the market system that it regulates.20
More simply, the SEC has an institutional interest in more
significant organizational and industry-wide reform with respect to
companies under its regulatory jurisdiction and is not as
susceptible to pressures for prosecutorial results. Accordingly, it
could design a mandate for a corporate monitor that would be more
extensive than what has been typical, and federal prosecutors could
give it their support. The monitor could continue to be a prominent
lawyer, judge, or other professional, whose stature is useful when
the monitor must deal with executives who might be inclined to
continue past practices.
On the issue of competence to accomplish meaningful reform, I
argued that social psychologists and organizational theorists should
be enlisted as consultants by corporate monitors in order to bring
their knowledge of group, organizational, and institutional causes
of misconduct to the reform of companies.21 Although they are not
19

See Bad Barrel, supra note 14, at 73–76.
This jurisdiction comes from the fact that public companies are reporting
companies under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which means they
are companies whose securities are traded in organized markets. See generally
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l (West 2010).
21
See Bad Barrel, supra note 14, at 76–79.
20
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likely to be the right persons for the position of corporate monitor
(i.e., not having the adequate “stature” to deal with senior
executives), they would be ideal for the consultant role, similar to
accountants, finance specialists, and outside lawyers who are
brought in for their expertise. Moreover, enlisting social
psychologists and organizational theorists would not only bring
their expertise to reform efforts, but their participation would also
reinforce the view that organizational corruption is not only due to
individual factors; in other words, it would ensure that group,
organization, and institutional factors are adequately recognized. In
addition, their involvement would counter the current bias—held
by academics and practitioners alike—concerning problems in
business organizations, which tends to view them as just matters of
financial reform and finance.
It should also be recognized that a corporate monitor can help a
firm in its rehabilitation, which is a social process, whether the
corruption in the firm was widespread or limited. Organizational
theorists who study firm rehabilitation point out that it passes
through several stages: (i) discovery and identification of the facts
of the scandal; (ii) offering an adequate explanation for it; (iii)
undergoing punishment; and (iv) rehabilitation proper, which
includes internal changes and an explanation of the reform to
external parties.22 By the time a corporate monitor is installed, the
firm has generally disclosed the facts and reasons for the scandal,
offered a suitable explanation, and accepted its punishment.
Clearly, a major role for the monitor in the rehabilitation of the
organization is to affect the necessary internal changes to the firm
and to make it clear to outsiders that the changes adequately
address the corruption and that the firm is truly reformed. Without
rehabilitation, a firm may continue to be punished “informally,” as
customers, regulators, and the media deem the official punishment
to be too light and the internal reforms to be inadequate. Thus,
while the monitor is engaged in substantive reforms, he or she also
has a symbolic or signaling function to internal and external
constituencies.23
22

See Michael D. Pfarrer et al., After the Fall: Reintegrating the Corrupt
Organization, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 730, 735–40 (2008).
23
The monitor thus becomes a symbol for those in the organization who
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Finally, the responsibility of a government organization for a
corporate problem suggests that the government organization can
be reformed as well. For example, there may well be group,
organizational, and cultural issues at the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Treasury Department, which,
during the financial crisis, led these agencies to engage in unethical
and unprincipled transgressions: saving certain financial
institutions, but not others; strong-arming Bank of America into
purchasing Merrill Lynch; and supporting the payment of
counterparties of American International Group.24 It would appear
that, for reasons of sovereign immunity and other doctrines,
organizational liability with its corporate monitor is not possible
here, whether criminal or civil, and the question arises how reform
of these agencies can be achieved, except through the political
process and Congressional oversight. There are, however,
Inspectors General and oversight boards, which provide outside
perspectives and reform suggestions to the agencies, and they have
sparked reforms within the SEC and watched over the actions of
the Treasury.25 My suggestion for corporate monitors to enlist the
wish to reform it and who are undertaking the necessary cultural changes. They
can then act under the authority of the monitor and use his or her power. See
generally Peter Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417 (2009) (arguing that criminal
prosecution through the use of deferred prosecution agreements actually works
as a useful tool in reforming the organization by expressing a social message to
it that spurs its reform and overcomes the firm’s reluctance to change its
culture).
24
In an opinion rejecting a settlement between the SEC and Bank of
America, Judge Rakoff expressed his own concerns about the conduct of the
SEC in its investigation of Bank of America’s disclosure violations regarding
the Merrill Lynch merger. See generally Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Bank of
America, Nos. 09-CV-6829 (JSR), 10-CV-0215 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010).
25
For example, the SEC Inspector General investigated the SEC’s
inadequate regulation of investment bank holding companies and mishandling of
inspections of Bernie Madoff. See OFFICE OF AUDITS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF OCIE
EXAMINATIONS OF BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT SECURITIES, LLC (2009).
For the Treasury, there is a Congressional Oversight Panel reviewing its actions
during the financial crisis, see CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, http://cop.senate.gov
(last visited Oct. 13, 2010), and a Special Inspector General of the Troubled
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help of social psychologists and organizational theorists could
equally apply to these officials and reviewing boards. With this
expert aid, Inspectors General and oversight boards could make
reform proposals for these agencies that would be more effective in
addressing their organizational and institutional defects.

Asset Relief Program, see OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE
TROUBLE ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, http://www.sigtarp.gov (last visited Oct. 13,
2010).

